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1. Introduction
In economies with perfectly functioning labor markets, labour taxation distorts the labour
market and lowers employment but does not create unemployment. When labour market
imperfections leads to wage rates above market clearing levels, labour taxes normally
aggravate unemployment by widening the gap between labour cost and opportunity cost of
labour. Recent research has shown that it is not only the magnitude of the tax wedge that
matters. The specific structure of labour taxation, in particular, the degree of labour tax
progression is also of great importance. The way in which tax progression affects
unemployment, however, crucially depends on the particular underlying labour market
imperfection.
The analysis of tax progression within the wage bargaining and the search and matching
framework has shown robust results for several wage bargaining models by demonstrating that
an increase in tax progression leads to wage moderation and is good for employment (see, e.g.
Koskela and Vilmunen 1996, Koskela and Schöb 1999 and Heijdra and Lighart 2005), the
results for efficiency wage models, where firms unilaterally decide upon both the wage rate and
the employment level, are still mixed. There, wage moderation has a positive effect on labour
demand but a negative effect on individual labour effort and thus workers’ productivity. Hoel
(1990) was the first to analyze the overall effect of tax progression in such a framework. He
shows that a higher marginal income tax rate, which leaves the average tax level unchanged at
the initial equilibrium wage rate, will decrease the gross wage and unemployment (see also
Goerke 1999). Fuest and Huber (1998) show that for a rise in tax progression such that the tax
burden per worker is the same in the old and new equilibrium, the result might reverse. Using
the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) shirking model, Pissarides (1998) in turn, does not find any
effect of the tax structure on the wage rate. This is due to the fact that the individuals’ effort
decisions in this model are discrete: workers either shirk or do not shirk. When effort is a
continuous variable, however, Soerensen (1999) shows that higher tax progression induces
wage moderation and lowers both unemployment and work effort (also see Picard and
Toulemonde 2003 who derive a similar result in a generic model that allows to analyze
1different types of labour market imperfections). All these results do not carry over to models
where workers differ in their productivity. A tax reform that raises marginal tax rates at all
income levels and increases (decreases) average taxes at high (low) income levels may lead to
higher gross wages and unemployment (see Andersen and Rasmussen 1999). Rasmussen
(2002) shows that in the long-run with free entry and exit of firms when aggregate employment
is determined by the zero-profit condition, changes in profits may imply that higher wage tax
progressivity will negatively affect employment if the marginal tax rate is high enough. These
results cast doubts that tax progression is always good for employment in an efficiency wage
framework.
In this paper we focus on revenue-neutral changes of the degree in tax progression in
an efficiency wage model where homogenous workers can chose their optimal work effort
level continuously and want to contribute to the literature in two ways. We first want to
highlight the role of the governmental budget in determining the impact tax progression has on
employment. The degree of tax progression does not only affect gross wages and workers
outside options, but also affect the way in which the government can substitute payroll for
wage taxes or increase tax allowances in a revenue-neutral way. To see this, consider a
revenue-neutral tax reform that raises both the marginal wage tax and the tax exemption by
initially keeping the wage rate constant. This leads to wage moderation. The higher the total
marginal tax wedge, the more this wage moderation reduces tax revenues and the less the
government can raise the workers’ tax exemption. For any given increase of the marginal tax
rate, the effort enhancing effect thus decreases with the total tax wedge. A lower effort level
lowers the workers’ productivity labor and demand becomes smaller at any given wage rate. If
the revenue-neutral raise in the tax exemption becomes very small, the initial positive
employment effect may be reversed.
There is a second point we want to stress in this paper. The literature widely ignores
the different ways in which the government can vary the degree of tax progression. Rather than
changing wage tax progression directly, tax progression is also affected by the way in which
labour taxes are levied on workers and firms. The impact of the composition of wage and
2payroll taxes on progressivity have not yet been analyzed in an efficiency wage framework,1
while results from union bargaining models already exist. Koskela and Schöb (1999) show that
when tax bases for wage and payroll taxes are equal, it does not matter who de jure pays the
tax on labour. In this case the total tax wedge, i.e. the sum of wage and payroll taxes, is
sufficient to specify the distortion due to labour taxation. But this equivalence result ceases to
hold when the tax bases are not equal because of tax exemptions (see also Koskela and Schöb
2002). A revenue-neutral restructuring of labour taxes towards the narrower tax base then
decreases the gross wage and boosts employment. In this paper we will ask, whether these
findings concerning the impacts of differences in the structure of labour taxation hold in an
efficiency wage framework with non-discrete work effort choice. In particular we are
interested in whether tax progression per se or the specific way in which it is achieved matters
for the determination of its employment effects.
After the presentation of some stylized facts about labour taxation and tax progression
for OECD countries in terms of wage and payroll taxes in section 2, we develop a model
framework that mirrors the stylized facts in section 3 and provide comparative statics of tax
parameters on wage setting, work effort, labour demand and aggregate output. Then we
separately analyze the two distinct two tax-revenue neutral changes in tax progression. In
section 4 we focus on changes in the wage tax progression by varying the marginal wage tax
and the tax exemption. Section 5 then considers how a change in the composition of wage and
payroll taxes affect wage setting and employment. Finally we present concluding comments.
1 One exception is Picard and Toulemonde (2003) who show that in general a revenue-neutral shift of a
tax on firms to a tax on workers has an incidence on employment (their proposition 2); tax
progressivity, however, is only analyzed in the context of varying wage tax progression (see their
proposition 3).
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Table 1: Labour taxation in the OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Country Averagewage tax
Social se-
curity contri-
butions paid
by employee
Marginal
wage tax
average wage
tax rate
progression
Social se-
curity contri-
butions paid
by employer
average
payroll tax
rate
progression
Tax
exemption in
Euro
Calculated
a/w
b
in Euro
Standardized
unemployment
rate 2004
Australia 24.3 0 31.5 7.2 6.0 0.0 8,761 22.9 n.a. 5.5
Austria 10.8 18.0 24.6 13.8 29.0 -0.2 14,931 56.1 5,057 4.8
Belgium 26.6 14.0 40.8 14.2 34.5 4.8 12,398 34.8 8,193 7.8
Canada 17.8 6.9 24.2 6.4 4.2 -7.0 9,002 26.4 5,446 7.2
Czech Republic 11.4 12.5 17.5 6.1 34.9 -0.1 5,008 34.9 3,448 8.3
Denmark 30.6 10.6 38.6 8.0 0.0 0.0 7,789 20.7 11,650 5.4
Finland 24.2 6.1 38.2 14.0 24.1 0.0 10,987 36.6 4,797 8.9
France 13.1 13.6 18.8 5.7 39.3 0.1 7,719 30.3 5,092 9.7
Germany 19.6 20.9 35.6 16.0 20.8 0.1 15,822 44.9 3,872 9.5
Greece 0.6 16.0 12.6 12.0 28.0 0.0 16,464 95.2 n.a. 10.5
Hungary 12.4 13.5 26.0 13.6 33.6 -3.2 5,059 52.3 1,547 5.9
Iceland 25.5 0.2 36.8 11.3 5.7 0.0 9,350 30.7 9,439 3.1
Ireland 10.6 5.0 21.0 10.4 10.8 0.0 13,520 49.5 6,552 4.5
Italy 18.6 9.2 34.9 16.3 33.1 0.1 12,285 46.7 4,208 8.0
Japan 5.9 11.6 11.3 5.4 12.6 0.2 14,907 47.8 7,487 4.7
Korea 2.2 7.1 11.0 8.8 8.9 0.2 26,566 80.0 5,313 3.7
Luxembourg 8.9 13.8 25.1 16.2 12.9 -0.6 20,347 64.5 11,349 4.8
Mexico 3.0 1.5 13.7 10.7 10.7 -2.2 7,110 78.1 n.a. 2.4
Netherlands 8.5 25.8 19.6 11.1 10.8 -5.7 19,290 56.6 10,219 4.6
New Zealand 20.7 0 33.0 12.3 0.0 0.0 10,521 37.3 n.a. 3.9
Norway 20.9 7.8 28.0 7.1 13.0 0.0 8,424 25.4 9,966 4.4
Poland 6.1 25.4 9.2 3.1 20.4 0.1 4,846 33.7 3,020 18.8
Portugal 5.6 11.0 14.0 8.4 23.8 0.0 7,820 60.0 2,216 6.7
Slovak Republic 7.9 13.4 16.5 8.6 35.6 -0.1 5,380 52.1 1,755 18.0
Spain 12.7 6.4 22.4 9.7 30.6 0.2 9,742 43.3 6,074 10.9
Sweden 24.0 7.0 28.9 4.9 32.7 0.0 4,422 17.0 4,172 6.4
Switzerland 9.8 11.1 18.4 8.6 11.0 -0.1 16,083 46.7 7,570 4.4
Turkey 15.4 15.0 17.6 2.2 21.4 0.0 2,058 12.5 0 9.5
United Kingdom 15.9 8.5 24.5 8.6 12.8 2.9 11,547 35.1 4,605 4.7
United States 16.5 7.7 21.3 4.8 7.7 0.1 7,872 22.5 1,747 5.5
Source: OECD (2004)
Legend: Tax rates are for the year 2004 for a single person with 100% of average wage. Column (4) shows the difference between marginal and average rate of
income tax. Social security contributions paid by employees are assumed not to be subject to tax exemption. Social security contributions are marginal contributions.
As an approximation it is assumed that for each country the tax schedule consists of a tax exemption and a constant marginal tax rate. The exchange rate between
US-Dollar and Euro was assumed to be unity. Social assistance level do not include housing costs. Numbers of social assistance are from 2002 taken from OECD
(2004), Benefits and Wages, OECD Indicators.
42. Labour taxation and tax progression in OECD countries: stylized facts
Table 1 lists wage taxes and payroll taxes in the OECD countries, calculated for an average
productive worker who is not married. The first and second column report the average income
taxes and the social security contributions paid by the employees. The third column shows the
marginal income taxes. The fourth column states the average wage tax progression (see
Lambert 2001, chapters 7-8). This rate states the difference of marginal and the average
income tax rate due to the tax exemption for wage taxes. The higher this difference, the more
progressive wage taxation is. Table 1 shows that all OECD countries have a progressive wage
tax system though there are huge differences with the highest degree of progression being
reported for Italy, with 16.3 percentage points, and the lowest one for Turkey with only 2.2
percentage points.
Payroll taxes, reported in the fifth column, mainly consist of social security
contributions paid by the employer. The average payroll tax progression, stated in the last
column is very small and even negative for some countries because of some work-related
social-security contributions that are not dependent on wage income. While the maximum
difference for the wage rate is above 16 percentage points, the difference for the payroll taxes
are substantially lower in all countries with a maximum below five percentage points. Thus,
while we observe highly progressive wage tax systems, the payroll tax systems are
approximately proportional.
3. Model framework and comparative statics
To start with, we specify the time sequence of decisions, and then analyze by using backward
induction the decision of workers on their work effort, the optimal wage setting and labour
demand of firms and, based on these private decisions, finally analyze two distinct revenue-
neutral tax reforms that allow the government to alter the degree of tax progression.
53.1 Time sequence of decisions
When firms decide on the wage rate w they pay their workers and on the employment level,
they take the tax policy as given and assume that they cannot influence the tax parameters. The
government therefore behaves as a Stackelberg leader by setting three tax instruments. To raise
revenues, the government can employ either a payroll tax s or a wage tax t. Both tax rates are
constant with respect to the respective tax base. In addition, the government can affect the
degree of tax progression by granting a tax exemption a that reduces the tax base for the wage
rate t to Law )( - . In the presence of a positive tax exemption a, the marginal tax rate t
exceeds the average tax rate )1( wat -  so that the tax system is linearly progressive.2 The net-
of-tax wage is given by tawtwn +-= )1( . While, according to table 1, the wage tax is
progressive in all OECD countries, the payroll tax i.e. the social security contributions paid by
employers is approximately proportional. We therefore abstract from an additional tax
exemption for the payroll tax so that the tax base for the payroll tax is wL . The gross wage
rate, i.e. the labour cost is then given by )1( swwg += .
We can study two ways in which the government can alter tax progression without
changing tax revenues. It can directly affect the wage tax progression by increasing the wage
tax rate and accordingly increasing the tax exemption. Alternatively, it can increase the wage
tax and lower the payroll tax. Such a change in the structure of labour taxation also affects the
overall tax progression as it changes the shares of the progressive wage tax and the
proportional payroll tax.
When the government announces its tax policy in the first stage, firms decide in the 2nd
stage on the wage rate w and the employment level L. Thereby, they cannot perfectly monitor
the individual work effort e of its workers. As effort increases the disutility of working,
workers have an incentive to shirk but this incentive can be offset by paying higher wages,
since this raises the penalty for shirking workers who are caught and fired. On-the-job workers
can decide upon their work effort in the 3rd stage. The time sequence of decisions is shown in
2 For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for other elaboration, see
e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).
6Figure 1. In what follows, we proceed by using backward induction and start our analysis with
the 3rd stage of the game, in which the wage rate, employment and tax parameters are already
determined.
Figure 1: Sequence of decisions
1  stagest
Tax policy
( , , )t s a
Wage setting ( )
and
labour demand ( )
w
L
Effort
determination ( )e
2  stagend 3  stagerd
3.2 Effort determination
Each worker decides about effort e in the 3rd stage by taking the tax policy, wage setting and
labour demand as given. Since effort cannot be fully controlled by firms, they can set a
standard effort that we normalize to one. If workers meet this standard, their jobs are secure,
but if they shirk by providing less effort firms can fire them. However, effort cannot be
monitored perfectly. The employment probability can thus be described by a minimum
function. For effort lower than the standard we assume, for analytical convenience, an iso-
elastic probability function of employment de  where 0>d  denotes the (constant) employment
probability elasticity of effort.3 The employment probability rises with effort for 1<e  and is 1
for higher effort level so that we have the employment probability function ),1min( deºr  and
the probability of being laid off ),1min(1 de- . The parameter d is increasing in both monitoring
intensity and monitoring efficiency. Low values of d makes it less risky for workers to shirk
while +¥®d  implies perfect monitoring and the firing of all workers who do not meet the
working effort standard.
3 We exclude the case where d = 0  because in this case, the job would be secure even without providing
effort and total output would fall to zero. This would lead firms to set a wage rate equal to zero. Both
employment supply and demand would then be indetermined. Futhermore, note that if the detection
probability should be concave in effort, we would have to assume 1£d .
7We consider a representative risk-neutral worker with a specific utility function V  that
is additively separable and quasi-linear,
(1) ( )beegweV dndw ),1min(1)]()[,1min( -+-= ,
where b  denotes the workers’ outside option, which equals some exogenous unemployment
income, and )(eg  denotes the disutility of effort e as a convex function, i.e.
0)('',0)(' >> egeg .4 Working time per worker is fixed and normalized to unity.
The optimal individual effort level can be derived from the first-order condition
0)(')))((1 =---= - egebegwdeV dndwe . The worker chooses an effort level at which the
expected utility loss of working harder, which occurs with probability de , equals the expected
utility gain from an increased probability of staying in employment 1-dde  and receiving the
surplus begwn -- )( . Using the parameterization aa= /1)( eeg  yields the following effort
function
(2) a-= )( bwAe n ,
where aa+= ))(( ddA  is constant. We assume a concave effort function with respect to the
difference between the net-of-tax wage rate and the workers’ outside option so that we have
1<a . Effort is increasing in the net-of-tax wage rate, 0>nwe  and decreasing in the outside
option 0<be . Furthermore, we have 0<te , because this reduces the penalty when caught
shirking, 0>we , and 0>ae , as both a higher wage rate w and a higher tax exemption a
increase the rent from being employed.5
4 In what follows, the derivatives of functions with one variable will be denoted by using primes, while
partial derivatives will be denoted by subscripts indicating what variable we are differentiating with
respect to.
5 We could allow for a more general utility function that is concave in terms of rents and convex in terms
of disutility of effort so that we could include risk aversion. Qualitative results by using the standard
HARA-type utility function (suggested originally by Merton (1971) are similar and are available upon
request.
83.3 Wage setting and labour demand
In the 2nd stage of the game, each firm takes the tax parameters as given and decide about the
wage rate w and labour demand L . Thereby it takes into account how the representative
worker will adjust work effort when the wage rate w changes. Production depends on effective
labour input eL  so that the production function for the representative firm can be written as
)(eLf  with 0)(' >eLf  and .0)('' <eLf  The output price is normalized to unity and profits
are defined by LsweLf )1()( +-=p . The first-order conditions in terms of L  and w  are
esweLf /)1()(' +=  and weseLf /)1()(' +=  so that we obtain the well-known Solow
condition (Solow 1979)
(3) 1=
e
wew ,
according to which the wage elasticity of effort is equal to one: the optimal wage is set such
that a one percent increase in the wage rate (and thus the production costs) leads to a one
percent increase in output (at given employment level). From the Solow-condition (3) we can
derive an explicit solution for the optimal (efficiency) wage rate for
0))1(()1( 1 >-+--a= -btatwetew :
(4)
)1)(1( a--
-
=
t
tabw .
The comparative statics of the wage function shows that )()( absignwsign t -=  and 0<aw .
The Solow condition states that it is optimal for the firm to set the wage such that the relative
change in the wage rate is equal to the relative change in effort. If ab = , the level of t has no
effect on the optimal wage rate. If ab > , however, a tax rate increase raises the impact a wage
rate increase has on effort: the higher is t, the stronger is the relative increase of bwn -  due to
a wage increase. A higher tax exemption a, by contrast, makes working more attractive and
therefore allows the firms to decrease the efficiency wage rate. Note that the payroll tax s does
not affect wage determination.
9For the labour demand function, we use the parametric specification e-e= )()( 1 eLeLf
with 10 <e<  denoting the revenue share of labour and )1( e-  the profit share, respectively.
The labour demand function is given by
(5) [ ] 1)1( -dd-+= eswL ,
where 1)1(1 >e-ºd  and .)1(1 e>e-eº-d  The comparative statics of labour demand with
respect to effort and the payroll tax are 0)1( 1 <-d= -eLLe , and
[ ] 0)1()1( 111 <+d-=+d-= --d-d- sLeswwLs . The wage tax and the tax exemption – levied on
workers – only affect labour demand indirectly via the effort determination, and the payroll tax,
only affect labour directly via the gross wage rate. The total effect of a change in the wage rate
w, however, affects labour demand in two different ways. There is a negative direct effect
.01 <d-= -LwLw  and a positive indirect effect of the wage rate via effort
[ ] 12 )1()1()1()1( --dd- -d=-d+-d= eLeeesweL wwwe . The former effect dominates so that a
higher wage rate w decreases labour demand. For the concave production function the absolute
value of the wage elasticity of labour demand is lower than in the case when wages do not
affect effort. Substituting in the Solow condition, the total wage elasticity of labour demand in
the firm’s profit maximum becomes
(6) 1-=
L
w
dw
dL .
Effective labour input eL  and the wage bill wLs)1( +  remain constant due to a marginal wage
increase and thus profit. This is a complementary condition to the Solow-condition.
Having analyzed workers and firms behaviour with respect to changes in the tax
parameters, we can now turn to the first stage. Rather then analyzing optimal tax systems, we
consider small tax reforms in the first stage and focus on revenue-neutral changes in (i) wage
tax progression (section 4) and (ii) the structure of labour taxation on wage formation, effort
determination, employment and output (section 5).
4. Revenue-neutral changes in wage tax progression
We assume constant public expenditures of size G so that a balanced budget requires
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(7) [ ] LswawtG +-= )( .
Tax progression increases when the difference between the marginal tax wedge st +  and the
average tax rate, wtast /)( -+  increases. A revenue-neutral increase in both the wage tax rate
t and the tax exemption a, we call an increase in wage tax progression.
What is the combination of changes in the wage tax rate t  and the tax exemption a  in
combination with the incurred change in the wage rate w  that will keep government tax
revenues constant? Total differentiation of (7) gives 0=++= dwGdaGdtGdG wat . Taking
into account the induced change on the wage rate dawdtwdw at += , this can be written as
(see Appendix 1 for details)
(8) 0)()( =+++= dawGGdtwGGdG awatwt .
If we are on the upward-sloping part of the Dupuit-Laffer curve for both the wage tax rate and
the tax exemption meaning that the tax revenues increase in t and decrease in a, we have
0>+ twt wGG  and 0<+ awa wGG . Since 0/ >= wtaLGw  (see Appendix 1) sufficient
conditions for this to hold are 0>tG  and 0<aG .
4.1 The effects on wages and effort
Now we are prepared to explore the behavioral effects of tax revenue-neutral change in wage
tax progression. After calculations delegated to the Appendix 1, we obtain the effect of an
increase in wage tax progression on the wage rate w.
(9)
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+
-
+
=
=
a
w
a
at
dG
G
Gw
w
t
aww
dt
dw
1
)(
0
.
Since we have 0>wG  and 0<aG  due to our assumption of an upward-sloping Dupuit-Laffer
curve, the denominator of (9) is positive. As for the numerator in (9) using the partial
derivatives of (3) imply
0
)1)(1()1()1(
)1)(1)(())(1()(
22 <a--
a
-=
a--
a-----a-
=
-
+
t
w
t
tawabw
t
aww at ,
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so that we obtain an unambiguous wage moderation effect of raising tax progression:
0
0
<
=dGdt
dw .
If the firm lowers the wage rate, it benefits from lower wage costs but at the same time suffers
from lower work effort that reduces labour productivity. In the initial equilibrium the firm sets
the wage rate such that these two effects outweigh each other at the margin. A revenue-neutral
increases in wage tax progression implies that it becomes beneficial for firms to lower the wage
rate because the effect on effort becomes smaller when the marginal tax rate increases.
To determine the impact on labour demand and work effort, we have to derive the
change in the gross and net-of-tax wage rate, respectively. As we keep the payroll tax
constant, a fall in the wage rate w also lowers the gross wage rate )1( sw + . The change in the
net-of-tax wage rate is given by:
(10)
dt
dwt
dt
dataw
dt
dwn )1()( -++--= .
If the tax reform did not change the wage rate, increasing tax progression would leave the net-
of-tax wage rate unaffected.6 But when the wage rate falls, there are two negative effects on
the net-of-tax wage rate. First, there is the immediate the direct effect of wage moderation.
Second, there is an indirect budgetary effect. As the wage moderation lowers tax revenues, the
government has to lower the increase in the tax exemption a relative to the potential increase
0/ =dtdw . This further declines the net-of-tax wage rate so that the total effect is
unambiguously negative:
(10a) 0)1(
00
<
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
--=
== dGa
w
dG
n
dt
dw
G
Gt
dt
dw .
Effort depends positively on the net-of-tax wage, i.e. 0>nwe , so that we can immediately
deduce that worker’s effort also falls:
6          This can be seen from substituting (A4) in (10) and setting 0/ =dtdw .
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(11) 0
00
<=
== dG
n
w
dG dt
dwe
dt
de
n .
These findings are summarized in
Proposition 1: An increase of the revenue-neutral wage tax progression leads to wage
moderation that reduces both the gross wage rate and the net-of-tax wage rate. A fall in
the net-of-tax wage rate reduces individual work effort and thus negatively affects
labour productivity.
4.2 The effects on employment and output
Labour demand depends both on the gross wage and effort. Firms will lower the gross wage
but also face a lower labour productivity. Thus there are two countervailing effects on labour
demand. From the total differential of employment daeLdteLdweLLdL aetewew +++= )(  and
by using the revenue-neutral change in the tax exemption (7) we obtain
(12) dw
G
GeLeLLdt
G
GeLeLdL
a
w
aewew
a
t
aete ÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-++÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-= .
The first term equals the employment effect of a revenue-neutral tax reform when the wage
rate does not change. This term is zero (see Appendix 2 for the calculations) because a
revenue-neutral change of tax parameters without changing the wage rate would not alter the
net-of-tax wage rate. If the efficiency wage rate does not change, both effort and employment
do not change. The employment effect thus only depends on the induced wage rate change so
that we have:
(13)
00 ==
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-+=
dGa
w
aewew
dG dt
dw
G
GeLeLL
dt
dL .
To interpret this result and to sign the effect, we rewrite (13) in the following way:
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
-d
-
--=
÷
÷
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
ç
ç
è
æ
--=÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-
+
-=
= a
w
a
w
a
w
ae
wew
dG G
G
t
tsign
G
G
da
dL
dw
dL
sign
G
G
eL
eLLsign
dt
dLsign
)1(
)1(
0
.
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The first ratio indicate the relative impact the wage rate and the tax exemption has on
employment. Assume that we increase the wage rate and the tax exemption by the same
absolute amount which we set equal to one percent of the initial wage rate. The effect of the
wage rate, consisting of a direct effect via the gross wage and an opposing indirect effect via
raising effort on employment is then 1- . The change in the tax exemption only increases
effort. However, the effect of an equal-size increase in the tax exemption on the net-of-tax
wage rate is only )1/( tt -  the effect of a wage rate increase. Multiplied with the effort
elasticity of labour )1( -d  thus yields the total effect of the considered increase of the tax
exemption: )1/()1(// ttLwdadL --d=× .
By how much we can actually change the wage rate and the tax exemption when we
consider revenue-neutrality depends on the marginal tax revenues. The higher the tax revenue
of a tax parameter, the lower is the respective adjustment in a revenue-neutral tax reform. If
wG  is large, which is the case the stronger the total tax wedge ts +  is, a low absolute value of
aG , which is the case when t  is low, requires a large reduction of the tax exemption to
compensate for the induced effect.
The relative magnitudes can be seen best by setting 0=G . For this case, we obtain
tstGG aw /)(/ +=- . From this we find the following condition:
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Substituting in the explicit expressions for the general case with 0¹G  (see Appendix 2)
shows that this result also applies for the general case. If the total tax wedge ts +  becomes
very high, the wage moderating effect requires a higher downward adjustment of the tax
exemption. If this already has a strong impact on effort (which depends on the technology
parameter )1( -d ), it becomes very likely that employment will fall. The adverse effect of tax
progression on the budget adjustment requirements then outweigh the wage moderating effect
on the gross wage.
The effects of the revenue-neutral change in the wage tax progression on effective
labour input eL  and therefore on output are a priori unclear because an increase in tax
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progression has a negative effect on effort and an ambiguous effect on employment. The total
differential for )(eL  is
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Solving (15) by using the results derived before (see Appendix 2), we obtain:
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The effort effect of higher tax progression is unambiguously negative, while the employment
effect is a priori ambiguous but the first effect dominates according to equation (16). The
direct effect of a wage rate change on labour demand would exactly compensate for lower
work effort but the indirect effect that forces the government to reduce the tax exemption
increase further lowers effort and employment and therefore effective labour input.
In summing up the findings of this subsection, we can conclude with
Proposition 2: An increase of the revenue-neutral wage tax progression raises
(decreases) employment when the ratio of net-of-tax wage and revenue share of the
wage is higher (lower) than the effort elasticity of labour demand. Effective labor input
and output unambiguously fall.
5. Revenue-neutral changes in the composition of wage and payroll taxes
In this section we analyze the impacts of revenue-neutral changes in the composition of labour
taxation on effort determination, wage formation, employment and output. This analysis has
not yet been conducted within an efficiency framework but it allows for a comparison with the
results derived within a ‘right-to-manage’ union bargaining model. Koskela and Schöb (1999)
demonstrate in such a framework that a revenue-neutral change in the composition of labour
taxation affects neither the gross wage nor employment when the tax bases for the wage tax
and payroll tax are equal. But if there is a tax exemption for the wage tax, the tax base of the
wage tax is narrower than in the case of proportional payroll taxes. In this case a revenue-
15
neutral tax reform, which reduces the payroll tax rate and increases the wage tax rate, will
decrease the gross wage rate and thereby boost employment. When the tax bases are equal,
progression remains unchanged with the revenue-neutral change in labour taxes, while if wage
taxation is progressive due to a tax exemption, then a switch towards higher wage taxes and
lower payroll taxes, will make labour taxation more progressive and thus generate wage
moderation.
To study in how far these results hold when efficiency wage considerations matter, we
start with the identification of the respective tax reform and analyze the combination of
changes in the tax rates and the wage rate, which will keep government tax revenue constant.
Taking the total differential of the government budget constraint (6) with respect wage tax,
payroll tax and gross efficiency wage gives 0=++= dwGdsGdtGdG wst . The change on the
efficiency wage depends only on changes of the wage tax rate, dtwdw t= , so that we have
(17)
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dG G
wGG
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=0
.
If we are on the upward-sloping part of the Dupuit-Laffer curve, we have 0>+ twt wGG
(which always holds when 0>tG ) and 0>sG  so that a revenue-neutral increase in t goes
along with a lower payroll tax s.
5.1 The effects on wages and effort
The payroll tax borne by the employer does not affect the wage rate firms choose [cf. equation
(4)]. The wage rate therefore is only affected by the wage tax rate, i.e.
(18)
)1()1( 20 a--
-
==
= t
abw
dt
dw
t
dG
.
A rise in t unambiguously raises the wage rate when 0>- ab , which is in line with empirical
evidence. The total effect on the net-of-tax wage is given by dwtdtawdwn )1()( -+--= .
Substituting in equation (18) we obtain
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Condition (19) indicates that the direct effect of a rise in the wage tax is not fully compensated
by the indirect effect of a wage increase when there is a tax exemption so that the tax incidence
on firms is less than 100 percent. Therefore effort changes only due to a change in the
structure of labour taxation when there is a tax exemption, i.e.
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This finding can be summarized as follows in
Proposition 3: A revenue-neutral change in the composition of labour taxation that
raises tax progression (i.e. 0>a ) lowers both the net-of-tax wage rate and effort. If the
tax bases are the same (i.e. 0=a ), the tax reform does not affect the net-of-tax wage
rate and effort.
5.2 The effects on employment and output
The total differential of employment with respect to wage rate, payroll tax rate and wage tax
rate can be written as dsLdteLdweLLdL stewew +++= )(  and by using the revenue-neutral
change in labour taxation (17) we obtain
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Concerning the effects of a change in the composition of wage and payroll taxes there are both
direct and an indirect effects. The two direct effects reinforce each other. Both the increase in t
and w (note that we have dtwdw t= ) will have a negative net effect on labour demand. The
indirect effects work via government budget. The term st GG  is the weight of the positive
direct effect sL-  in the first bracket term and determines by how much the effect due to an
increase in t is offset. Since the wage rate also increases, the second indirect effect works in
exactly the same qualitative way as the first indirect effect, whereby in the second bracket term
sw GG  is the weight of the positive indirect effect sL- .
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It turns out that the conditions for the sign of the two bracket terms are the same and
depend on the same relationship between tax parameters and the constant-effort labour
demand elasticity as the employment effect of an increase in wage tax progression, i.e. (see
Appendix 3 for the calculations)
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Finally, we ask what is the effect of a change in the labour tax structure on the effective labour
input eL  and thereby on output. For 0>a  the total differential for )(eL  is
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(see Appendix 4 for calculations). Irrespectively of the way in which tax progression is raised,
it may happen that although employment increases when tax progression increases, effective
labour input and thus output will fall. If the tax bases are equal, i.e. 0=a , neither effort nor
labour is affected by the revenue-neutral change in the composition of wage and payroll taxes.
This means that effective input and therefore output are not affected as well.
We can summarize this finding in
Proposition 4: A revenue-neutral change in the composition of labour taxation that
raises tax progression (i.e. 0>a ) increases (decreases) employment when the ratio of
the net-of-tax wage and the revenue share of the wage is higher (lower) than the effort
elasticity of labour demand. Effective labour input and output unambiguously fall.
When the tax bases are equal, effort, employment, and output do not change.
The intuition for 0>a  is similar to the intuition for Proposition 2 and will not be repeated
here. This result shows that in the case of equal tax bases the structure of labour taxation does
not matter in terms of employment in the efficiency wage framework. The same result holds in
the union bargaining framework without efficiency considerations (see Koskela and Schöb
1999). Furthermore, both tax reforms increase tax progression and yield similar effects with
18
respect to effort, labour demand, effective labour input and output. This indicates a systematic
pattern of how the degree of tax progression actually affects the labour market and production.
6. Concluding remarks
The structure of labour taxes, i.e. payroll and wage taxes, in OECD countries is quite different
due to different tax rates and different regulations concerning tax allowances and tax credits
with respect to wage and payroll taxes. Wage taxation in OCED countries is progressive
though the degree of progressivity varies across countries. In the case of payroll taxes the
difference between marginal and average payroll taxes is very small, i.e. we observe
approximately proportional payroll tax systems in most OECD countries. For these stylized
facts we studied the impacts of two different tax-revenue neutral changes in wage tax
progression. First we analyzed the revenue-neutral tax reform where both the wage tax rate
and the tax exemption were increased so that wage tax progression increased. Then we
compared these findings with a rise in tax progression due to a change in the composition of
labour taxation towards the tax with the lower tax base.
When the wage tax system becomes more progressive our analysis shows that this leads
to wage moderation and to a fall of worker’s effort. Whether employment rises or falls
depends on the pre-existing tax system relative to the labour demand elasticity in terms of
work effort (see equations (14), (22)) because the magnitude of the total tax wedge affects the
way in which the government can influence workers’ effort in a revenue-neutral way. The
increase in the wage tax ceteris paribus raises the gross wage and lowers labor demand. The
larger the tax wedge, the more tax revenues fall due to the induced wage moderation and the
smaller is the revenue-neutral raise of the tax exemption or the cut in payroll taxes, which
ceteris paribus both increase labor demand. This budgetary effect is the driving force in both
tax reforms discussed in this paper. Different to the interpretation of an increase in employment
in trade union models, the rise in employment does not imply a rise in output. The opposite is
19
true. Since effort decreases we have an countervailing effect on effective labor input, which in
turn leads to an unambiguous decline in output.
Appendix 1
The total differential for (6) gives 0=++= dwGdaGdtGdG wat . Using
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we can write the total differential as 00 1 =++Û= - LdwtawdaGdtGdG at . Substituting in
the respective partial derivatives of labor and effort, applying at eawte )( --= , and assuming
that the tax revenues are positively related to the wage tax rate and negatively related to the
tax exemption according to the upward-sloping Dupuit-Laffer curve, we can determine the
sign of tG  and wG as follows:
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Using the expressions (A2) and (A3) we can now determine the revenue-neutral change of the
tax exemption when the wage tax rate is increased marginally:
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Substituting the RHS of (A4) for da  in the total differential dawdtwdw at +=  yields (9).
Appendix 2
Substituting (A4) for da  in the total differential daeLdteLdweLLdL aetewew +++= )(  gives
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Using the partial derivatives of the employment and effort functions, we obtain
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Using (A1) and (A3), we obtain after some further manipulations
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where 0)1()1)(/1( >-=-d+-d+- aaa eGeaetswe . From the effort determination (2) we
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Substituting the efficiency wage equation (4) for w  in (A7) gives condition (14).
Using the equations (11) and (A5) we can rewrite (15) as follows (using
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Using partial derivatives of the employment and effort functions, the common term
)( weww eLLeLe ++  can be written as
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Substituting in, we obtain condition (16).
Appendix 3
Taking the total differential of government budget constraint (6) with respect to wage tax,
payroll tax and gross efficiency wage gives dwGdsGdtGdG wst ++== 0 , whereby
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The second RHS term of equation (21) is
(A11) [ ]
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
d+-+
+
-ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
+
d
-+-=÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
-+
-
)(1
)1(1
))/((1
1
sts
sw
L
s
wtast
G
GLeLL
s
w
swew
.
Using equation (18) implies
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Finally, combining (A10) and (A12) yields
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This gives the conditions of (22).
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Concerning equation (23) we have
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Finally, we have using equation (A14) and the more precise specification of equation (A13)
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